Yale University

EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale
Discussion Papers

Economic Growth Center

7-1-2003

The Effectiveness of Juvenile Correctional Facilities: Public
Versus Private Management
Patrick Bayer
David E. Pozen

Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/egcenter-discussion-paper-series

Recommended Citation
Bayer, Patrick and Pozen, David E., "The Effectiveness of Juvenile Correctional Facilities: Public Versus
Private Management" (2003). Discussion Papers. 871.
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/egcenter-discussion-paper-series/871

This Discussion Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Economic Growth Center at EliScholar – A
Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. It has been accepted for inclusion in Discussion Papers by an
authorized administrator of EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. For more information,
please contact elischolar@yale.edu.

ECONOMIC GROWTH CENTER
YALE UNIVERSITY
P.O. Box 208269
New Haven, CT 06520-8269
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~egcenter/

CENTER DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 863

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF JUVENILE
CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES:
PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE MANAGEMENT

Patrick Bayer
Yale University
and

David E. Pozen
Oxford University

July 2003
(Revised November 2004)

Notes: Center Discussion Papers are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate discussions and
critical comments.
The authors wish to thank the Florida Department of Juvenile Justice (D.J.J.) and the Justice
Research Center (J.R.C.), Inc. for providing the data used in this study. In particular, we wish
to thank Sherry Jackson, Steven Chapman, and Ted Tollett from the Florida D.J.J. and Julia
Blankenship and Kristin Winokur from the J.R.C. for many helpful conversations concerning
the data and, more generally, concerning the operation of the D.J.J. We also thank Joe Altonji,
Austan Goolsbee, Jonathan Gruber, and an anonymous referee for valuable comments. We
gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the Yale Law School and the Yale Economics
Department.
This paper can be downloaded without charge from the Social Science Research Network electronic
library at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=441881
An index to papers in the Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper Series is located at:
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~egcenter/research.htm

The Effectiveness of Juvenile Correctional Facilities:
Public Versus Private Management
Patrick Bayer and David E. Pozen
Yale University
Abstract

This paper uses data on juvenile offenders released from correctional facilities in Florida to explore the
effects of facility management type (private for-profit, private nonprofit, public state-operated, and
public county-operated) on recidivism outcomes and costs. The data provide detailed information on
individual characteristics, criminal and correctional histories, judge-assigned restrictiveness levels, and
home zipcodes—allowing us to control for the non-random assignment of individuals to facilities far
better than any previous study. Relative to all other management types, for-profit management leads
to a statistically significant increase in recidivism, but, relative to nonprofit and state-operated facilities,
for-profit facilities operate at a lower cost to the government per comparable individual released. Costbenefit analysis implies that the short-run savings offered by for-profit over nonprofit management are
negated in the long run due to increased recidivism rates, even if one measures the benefits of reducing
criminal activity as only the avoided costs of additional confinement.

JEL Codes: H0; H1; H4; K0; K4
Keywords: Juvenile Crime; Juvenile Correctional Facilities; Recidivism; Prison Privatization;
Provision of Public Goods: Nonprofit, For-profit, Public

I. INTRODUCTION
Since its beginnings in the mid-1980s, prison privatization in the United States has
provoked several rounds of congressional hearings and hundreds of articles discussing its
philosophical, organizational, economic, and legal implications. At year-end 2001, privately
operated facilities held over 6.5 percent of America’s total adult correctional facility population,
representing more than 90,000 adult offenders.1 And in late 1999, privately operated facilities
held almost 30 percent of all juveniles in residential placement, representing more than 30,000
juvenile offenders.2 Following the United States’ example, many other countries introduced
private prison in the 1990s, and many more are considering the idea today.3
Setting off a national debate almost instantly, prison privatization emerged in adult
corrections when municipal and state governments—driven primarily by concerns over excessive
costs and crowding in public facilities—began in 1985 to contract with private firms to run
county jails and state prisons.4 Congress held hearings on prison privatization the next year, and
almost every criminal justice professional association took a stand on the issue. Despite the
protests of many, privatization has continued apace since then, with the capacity of private

1

Paige M. Harrison & Allen J. Beck, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice, Prisoners in 2001,
Bureau of Justice Statistics Bull. 1, 8 (Table 9) (July 2002).
2
Melissa Sickmund, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Department of Justice, Juvenile
Offenders in Residential Placement: 1997-1999, 7 Juvenile Offenders and Victims: National Report Series 1, 1
(March 2002). Private organizations also provide court-mandated supervision for thousands of other juveniles
through non-residential correctional programs such as mental health and substance abuse treatment programs.
3
Richard Harding, Private Prisons, in 28 Crime and Justice: A Review of Research 265, 268-69 (Michael H. Tonry
ed. 2001).
4
Private contractors had, in fact, managed adult correctional facilities in a number of U.S. states during the 1800s,
but by the beginning of the twentieth century all adult prisons were government run. For discussion of private
prisons’ historic role in America, see generally Blake McKelvey, American Prisons: A History of Good Intentions
(1977); Shaneen Borna, Free Enterprise Goes to Prison, 26 Brit. J. Criminology 321 (1986); John G. DiPiano,
Private Prisons: Can They Work? Panopticon in the Twenty-first Century, 21 New Eng. J. on Crim. & Civ.
Confinement 171 (1995). For discussion of how and why private prisons returned to the U.S., see David E. Pozen,
Managing a Correctional Marketplace: Prison Privatization in the United States and the United Kingdom, 19 J. L. &
Politics 253 (2003).

secure adult correctional facilities increasing 856 percent between 1991 and 1998.5 By the end
of 1999, fourteen corporations were operating over 150 private correctional facilities for adults in
the United States,6 earning combined annual revenues in excess of a billion dollars.
Already a significant owner/operator of juvenile correctional facilities, the private sector
began to assume a substantially greater role in juvenile corrections after Congress passed the
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act in 1974.7

This act formally encouraged

communities to develop alternatives to traditional incarceration, and privatization emerged as the
primary mechanism for deinstitutionalization.8 In 1999, there were approximately 1,100 public
and 1,800 private juvenile correctional facilities in operation nationwide,9 and by 1990 almost 90
percent of states had at least one contract with a nonprofit private corporation and 60 percent of
states had at least one contract with a for-profit corporation to operate a juvenile correctional
facility.10

A.

Prior Literature

For all the controversy engendered and for all the individuals affected by prison
privatization over the last two decades, empirical analysis has lagged the public interest. Two
leading surveys of research on prison privatization explicitly lament the paucity of empirical

5

Gaylene Styve Armstrong, Private vs. Public Operation of Juvenile Correctional Facilities 2 (2001).
Charles W. Thomas, Private Adult Correctional Facility Census: A “Real-Time” Statistical Profile, December 31,
1999 (1999), http://www.crim.ufl.edu/pcp/census/1999, visited November 21, 2003.
7
Pub. L. No. 93-415, 88 Stat. 1109 (1974) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5601 (1994)). In contrast with its episodic role
in adult corrections, the private sector—largely in the form of nonprofit charities and organizations—remained a
consistently important player in the sphere of juvenile corrections throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
See, for example, Barry Krisberg, The Legacy of Juvenile Corrections, 57 Corrections Today 122 (1995).
8
See Yitzhak Bakal & Harvey Lowell, The Private Sector in Juvenile Corrections, in Juvenile Justice and Public
Policy: Toward a National Agenda 196 (Ira M. Schwartz ed. 1992); Daniel J. Curran, Destructuring, Privatization,
and the Promise of Juvenile Diversion: Compromising Community-Based Corrections, 34 Crime & Delinq. 363
(1988).
9
Sickmund, supra note 2, at 1.
10
Robert B. Levinson & William J. Taylor, ACA Studies Privatization in Juvenile Corrections, 53 Corrections
Today 242, 248 (1991).
6

work on the subject, especially concerning recidivism outcomes.11 The empirical research has
instead tended to focus on cost and quality-of-confinement comparisons between public and
private facilities.12

Only one study comparing the recidivism rates of public and private

facilities, by Lonn Lanza-Kaduce and Karen Parker, has garnered any significant attention, and it
has been roundly criticized for its small sample size and errors in design and methodology.13
Moreover, no comparative recidivism analysis has ever considered the distinction between forprofit and nonprofit management in the private juvenile corrections industry. Given the large
role played by both for-profit and nonprofit institutions in juvenile corrections,14 the traditional
public-versus-private dichotomy provides an overly simplistic framework for evaluating
privatization.
The Florida Department of Juvenile Justice (D.J.J.), our data source for this study, rates
the correctional facilities under its care on recidivism and cost performance in its annual Program
11

Gerald G. Gaes, Scott D. Camp, & William G. Saylor, The Performance of Privately Operated Prisons: A Review
of Research, in Private Prisons in the United States: An Assessment of Current Practice, app.2, at 2, 31 (Douglas
McDonald et al. eds. 1998); Kenneth L. Avio, The Economics of Prisons, 6 Eur. J.L. & Econ. 143, 151 (1998).
12
Representative examples of public-versus-private studies in the U.S. include: William G. Archambeault & Donald
R. Deis, Jr., Cost Effectiveness Comparisons of Private versus Public Prisons in Louisiana: A Comprehensive
Analysis of Allen, Avoyelles, and Winn Correctional Centers (1996); Harry Hatry et al., The Urban Institute,
Comparison of Privately and Publicly Operated Correctional Facilities in Kentucky and Massachusetts (1989);
Charles H. Logan, National Institute of Justice, Well Kept: Comparing Quality of Confinement in a Public and a
Private Prison (1991); Douglas C. McDonald, The Costs of Operating Public and Private Correctional Facilities, in
Private Prisons and the Public Interest 86 (Douglas C. McDonald ed. 1990).
13
Lonn Lanza-Kaduce & Karen F. Parker, A Comparative Recidivism Analysis of Releasees from Private and
Public Prisons in Florida (1998) (finding that, relative to comparable inmates released from public prisons, inmates
released from private prisons had a lower recidivism percentage on four of five indicators). For the key critiques of
this study, see Florida Department of Corrections, Bureau of Research and Data Analysis, Preliminary Assessment
of a Study Entitled: “A Comparative Recidivism Analysis of Releasees from Public and Private Prisons in Florida”
(1998); Gaes, Camp, & Saylor, supra note 11, at 28-30. These criticisms remain salient for the subsequent,
published version of the study. Lonn Lanza-Kaduce, Karen F. Parker, & Charles W. Thomas, A Comparative
Recidivism Analysis of Releasees from Private and Public Prisons, 45 Crime & Delinq. 28 (1999). Three additional
studies have compared recidivism rates of public and private releasees, though none of these attempted to account
for differences between individuals assigned to different correctional facilities. Peter W. Greenwood, Susan Turner,
& Kathy Rosenblatt, Evaluation of Paint Creek Youth Center: Preliminary Results (1989); Dale K. Sechrest &
David Shichor, Quick Fixes in Corrections: Reconsidering Private and Public For-profit Facilities, 75 Prison J. 457
(1995); W. Clinton Terry, Lisa Stolzenberg, & Stewart J. D’Alessio, Private versus Public Placements: A Study of
Recidivism among Adjudicated Juvenile Offenders, 48 Juvenile & Family Court J. 33 (1997).
14
Nonprofits play a much smaller role in the private adult corrections sector: For-profit corporations manage the
vast majority of private adult correctional facilities in the United States, including 100 percent of the secure private
facilities.

Accountability Measures (P.A.M.) reports.15 These P.A.M. reports provide the starting point for
our analysis, but our study differs from and expands upon them in at least four important ways.
First and most fundamentally, our study distinguishes facilities by management type—private
for-profit, private nonprofit, public state-operated, and public county-operated—while the
P.A.M. reports do not. Second, our study uses multiple definitions of recidivism, including a
binary success-failure variable for both criminal charges and for adjudications, a survival-time
measure, and variables for sixteen specific categories of crime. The P.A.M. reports use only a
binary success-failure variable for adjudications. Third, our study incorporates many more
explanatory variables than the P.A.M. reports do in order to control as much as possible for
differences in the populations served by different types of correctional facilities. And fourth, our
cost-benefit analysis is entirely novel.
One other area of prior research merits a brief mention: studies of boot camps’ effects on
recidivism. MacKenzie, Wilson, and Kider’s recent meta-analysis of 29 studies “found no
overall difference in recidivism between boot camp participants (both juveniles and adults) and
comparison samples.”16

The U.S. Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention

reached a similar conclusion.17 It is unclear, however, how relevant these results are for the case
of Florida, as all of Florida’s juvenile boot camps have the same distinctive management type—
primary management by county sheriff’s departments, with state-level oversight. Whether or not
the Florida model of boot camp management affects recidivism remains an open question.

15

For example, Florida Department of Juvenile Justice, Justice Research Center, Inc., The 2003 PAM Report: A
Two-Year Analysis (December 2002), available at http://www.djj.state.fl.us/statsnresearch/mr/20031programaccountabilitymeasurereport.pdf, visited November 21, 2003. The annual production of these P.A.M.
reports is mandated by Florida Law. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 985.412(4)(a)(b) (1997).
16
Doris Layton MacKenzie, David B. Wilson, & Suzanne B. Kider, Effects of Correctional Boot Camps on
Offending, 578 Ann. Amer. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 126, 126 (2001).
17
National Criminal Justice Association, U.S. Department of Justice, Juvenile Justice Reform Initiatives in the
States: 1994-1996 30-33 (1997).

B.

Basic Design of Our Study

This paper attempts to fill an empirical void in the debate over prison privatization.
Using a unique dataset containing detailed information on over 5,000 juvenile offenders and 110
juvenile correctional facilities18 in Florida, we investigate the effects of correctional facility
management type—including public, private for-profit, and private nonprofit models—on
releasees’ recidivism outcomes and on monetary costs to the State of Florida.19 By investigating
the effects of facility management type on recidivism outcomes, this study achieves, necessarily,
a second purpose: shedding light on the impact of numerous personal and socio-demographic
characteristics on recidivism risk.20
By using the extensive information on the criminal history, residential locations, judgeassigned restrictiveness levels, and socio-demographic characteristics of the youths observed in
the sample, we are able to control for individual variation in the propensity to recidivate—and,
consequently, for the non-random assignment of individuals to facilities on the basis of these
characteristics—far better than any previous analysis. It is important to note, however, that we
are not able to control for the non-random assignment of juveniles to facilities on the basis of any
additional factors observable to juvenile corrections officials but not to the researcher. Thus, the
important caveat remains that the estimated differences across facility management types may be

18

The Florida Department of Juvenile Justice, in its official reports, refers to correctional facilities under its
supervision as “programs” rather than “facilities.” The two terms can be thought of as interchangeable; all
correctional programs are located within a specific facility. We use “facilities” throughout this paper for clarity and
consistency.
19
As the Florida D.J.J. does in its P.A.M. reports, we therefore assume that correctional facilities have the potential
to influence offenders’ post-release criminality. This influence could result from differentials in correctional facility
features such as staff-inmate interactions, implementation of rehabilitative and other programmatic services, policies
and procedures, and general atmosphere and ideology.
20
Currently, there is deep disagreement over what characteristics of an offender influence his or her probability of
recidivating, and to what extent. See Dean J. Champion, Measuring Offender Risk: A Criminal Justice Sourcebook
92-93 (1994).

driven in part by non-random assignment on unobserved factors.21 Many aspects of the analysis
and results that follow, however, limit the likelihood that non-random assignment on unobserved
factors affects the qualitative nature of the main conclusions of the paper.
By exploring both recidivism and costs, we are able to examine the two key variables of
interest in the economic literature on prison privatization.

In a nutshell, economic theory

predicts that private for-profit correctional facilities should operate efficiently due to the profit
motive, but in the absence of explicit linkages between revenues and recidivism outcomes, they
might make decisions designed to increase profits at the expense of increased recidivism.22
Currently, the standard private prison contract in the United States remunerates the corporate
operator based on the number of person-days of confinement supplied, subject to some minimal
level of amenities. A for-profit prison operator thus has almost no contractual incentive to
provide rehabilitation opportunities or educational/vocational training that might benefit inmates
after release, except insofar as these services act to decrease the current cost of confinement.23
Decreasing recidivism likely has a bigger role in the objective functions of publicly operated
facilities and private nonprofit facilities, if for no other reason than that the profit motive is not as
strong. Some commentators have argued that, of all the correctional facility management types,
private nonprofit operators ought to have the most success at decreasing recidivism due to their

21

A second caveat inherent in attempts to study recidivism is that the theoretically relevant dependent variables—
time devoted to criminal activity and the intensity thereof—cannot be directly measured. Traditionally, researchers
have employed a binary “success-failure” measure as a proxy recidivism variable. See Michael D. Maltz,
Recidivism 23 (1984). Moreover, measured recidivism is the product of both offender behavior and enforcement
activity. Lacking information on the behavior of the various Florida police and prosecutorial bodies, this study
could not attempt to resolve the potential problems with simultaneity and enforcement activity effects by means of
explicit controls. However, these problems are not a significant concern to the extent that the inclusion of variables
describing individual, criminal history, and neighborhood characteristics and, in particular, the twenty judicial
circuit dummy variables controls for the variation in the propensity of an individual, given a level of criminal
behavior, to be charged and adjudicated.
22
See Avio, supra note 11, at 150; Oliver Hart, Andrei Schleifer, & Robert W. Vishny, The Proper Scope of
Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons, 112 Quart. J. Econ. 1127 (1997).
23
See Peter Schmidt & Ann D. Witte, An Economic Analysis of Crime and Justice: Theory, Methods and
Applications 345-46 (1984).

organizational and programmatic flexibility, their mission focus, their use of volunteers, and
their freedom from political and profit constraints.24 Overall, then, without explicit linkages
between revenues and recidivism outcomes we might expect private nonprofit facilities to have
lower rates of recidivism, while we would generally expect for-profit facilities to have higher
rates of recidivism but to be able to operate at a reduced per-capita cost.
In Florida, the Department of Juvenile Justice does in fact evaluate the correctional
facilities it oversees on the basis of recidivism and costs.25 Because facilities’ revenues are not
directly linked to assessments of their recidivism performance except through the possible
elimination of particularly poorly performing facilities, this linkage is not likely to be strong for
the majority of facilities. Still, it is important to bear in mind that our study analyzes the relative
performance of facility management types in the presence of extensive evaluation and
monitoring of recidivism activity. In the absence of such evaluation and monitoring, economic
theory predicts that the performance of private for-profit facilities in terms of reducing
recidivism is likely to be worse.

II.

BACKGROUND ON FLORIDA D.J.J. AND DATA
A.

Background on Florida

The State of Florida has a number of features that make it suitable for a study on the
impact of correctional facility management type on recidivism. Behind only California, Florida
has the largest total number of juvenile offenders under correctional supervision—on October
27, 1999, juvenile correctional facilities in Florida were holding 6,813 offenders in residential

24

Daniel L. Low, Nonprofit Private Prisons: The Next Generation of Prison Management, 29 New Eng. J. on Crim.
& Civ. Confinement 1, 4, 55-56 (2003); Richard Moran, A Third Option: Nonprofit Prisons, N.Y. Times, August 23,
1997, at 23.
25
See, for example, Florida Department of Juvenile Justice, The 2003 PAM Report, supra note 15.

placement26—and it has over 100 facilities holding these offenders. Crucial to the aims of this
study, Florida is the only state with a significant sample (n > 10) of facilities managed each by a
public entity, a private for-profit entity, and a private nonprofit entity. Just as crucial, Florida
appears to be the only state that comprehensively tracks and records the post-release criminal
behavior of all juvenile offenders.27
Of all the U.S. states, Florida also operates the largest number of juvenile boot camps28—
the particular type of juvenile correctional facility that has aroused the most interest and scrutiny
over the past decade.29 Boot camps are a distinct type of juvenile correctional facility, designed
to shock their youths (or, in boot camp jargon, their “recruits”) into compliance with militarystyle discipline. All-male in Florida except in one instance, juvenile boot camps target youths
ages 14 to 18. Procedures for selecting youths for boot camps vary across counties, but all
youths assigned to boot camps must, in the opinion of D.J.J. commitment managers, “have
medical and psychological profiles conducive to successfully completing an intensive work,
educational, and disciplinary program.”30 After sanctioning the creation of juvenile boot camps
in 1989, the Florida Legislature authorized county governments to implement and operate them,
subject to a contractual agreement with the D.J.J.31

26

As a result, the juvenile boot camps

Sickmund, supra note 2, at 2.
For its diligence in the tracking and recording of youth recidivism, the Florida D.J.J. has received recognition
from the National Center for Juvenile Justice under a National Institute of Justice program that identifies best
practices in the use of juvenile data. See Florida Department of Juvenile Justice, Bureau of Data and Research, 2001
Program Accountability Measures Report: A Two-Year Analysis 2 (March 2001), available at
http://www.djj.state.fl.us/rnd/mr/accountability.html#2001-4, visited November 21, 2003.
28
Koch Crime Institute, Juvenile Boot Camps and Military Structured Youth Programs: 2000 Directory (2000).
29
See MacKenzie, Wilson, & Kider, supra note 16.
30
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 985.309(4) (1995). The primary considerations for boot camp selection, according to D.J.J.
officials, are that the youths do not have any physical problems that would make the rigorous exercise program
dangerous, and that they do not suffer from any mental illnesses requiring psychotropic medication.
31
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 985.309(1) (1995).
27

operating in Florida are all run by county sheriff’s departments with oversight from the D.J.J.32
In this way, along with one youth development center that is also county-operated, Florida’s boot
camps are fundamentally distinct from other juvenile correctional facilities not only because of
their policies and procedures but also because of sheriff’s departments’ role in managing them.
Recognizing the difference between county and state management, we treat the boot camps and
the youth development center run by sheriff’s departments as a fourth category of juvenile
correctional facility—separate from the public state-operated, private for-profit, and private
nonprofit facilities—in our study, referring to them as County facilities.

B.

Data Overview

The primary data source for this study is the internal database that the Florida Department
of Juvenile Justice maintains for juvenile offenders under its care. We were granted access to the
D.J.J.’s records on all youths released from a Florida-based juvenile correctional facility between
July 1, 1997 and June 30, 1999. These data provide complete histories of the experience of each
individual in the Florida juvenile justice system, including records of all past arrests,
adjudications,33 sentences, and facility assignments. The data also provide some basic sociodemographic information such as date of birth, race, and zipcode of residence. 16,164 youths are
included in the full sample.
The D.J.J. tracks the criminal activity of all juvenile offenders for one year after their
release so that if a releasee commits a recidivism offense while still a juvenile (under 18 years of
age), our data indicate the date and type(s) of crime(s) for which he or she was charged and/or
32

Florida Department of Juvenile Justice, Bureau of Data and Research, A Profile of Recruits Admitted to
Department of Juvenile Justice Boot Camp Programs Between Inception and March 15, 1997, 1 Research Digest 1,
1 (May 1997), available at http://www.djj.state.fl.us/RnD/r_digest/Issue1/issue1.pdf, visited November 21, 2003.
33
An adjudication, in the vernacular of the juvenile justice system, is analogous to a conviction in the adult justice
system.

adjudicated.34 For our analysis, we restrict attention to those individuals who were exactly 17
years of age or younger at the time of release. This restricts the sample to 8,400 individuals,
about whose correctional placements and subsequent charges/adjudications we have complete
information.35
Table 1 describes the number of facilities and individuals released from these facilities by
management type and restrictiveness level. Florida law determines five restrictiveness levels for
juvenile correctional facilities, ranging from minimum risk to maximum risk.36 A restrictiveness
level is assigned to each adjudicated individual by his or her judge, reflecting the judge’s
evaluation of the appropriate detention environment for the individual. According to the D.J.J.,
“[h]igher restrictiveness levels are characterized by tighter physical security, closer supervision,
… longer lengths of stay, [and] more intensive treatment and overlay services such as mental
health and drug treatment.”37 As the table clearly demonstrates, only one of the facilities below
moderate restrictiveness level (Level 3) is operated by for-profit or county management, and
none of the maximum restrictiveness level (Level 5) facilities are operated by nonprofit or state
management.38 Moreover, the minimum restrictiveness level (Level 1) facilities are all non-

34

In the analyses that follow, we use both criminal charges and adjudications to measure recidivism. Other possible
definitions of recidivism include subsequent arrests and correctional placements, but we lack data on these. Because
they represent sentenced crimes, (re-)adjudications provide the most reliable indicator of (known) recidivism
behavior; for this reason, the Florida D.J.J. also uses adjudications to evaluate recidivism. See, for example, Florida
Department of Juvenile Justice, The 2003 PAM Report, supra note 15, at 36.
35
For individuals observed multiple times in the sample (repeat recidivists), we include only their first correctional
placement as an observation. Including the subsequent correctional placements of these youths would have had the
effect of oversampling individuals with shorter sentences.
36
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 985.03(45) (1997). Since the time of this study’s evaluation period, the Florida D.J.J. has ceased
using the “minimum risk” classification; the D.J.J. now classifies these facilities as “non-residential.” See Florida
Department of Juvenile Justice, The 2003 PAM Report, supra note 15, at 1-6.
37
Florida Department of Juvenile Justice, Bureau of Data and Research, 2000 Outcome Evaluation Report, app.1, at
8 (February 2000), available at http://www.djj.state.fl.us/RnD/mr/2000-7/2000-7_Appendix1.pdf, visited November
21, 2003. This report also contains descriptions of the five restrictiveness levels. Id. at 8-16.
38
Whereas the Florida D.J.J. refers to minimum risk facilities as “Level 2” facilities, low risk facilities as “Level 4,”
moderate risk facilities as “Level 6,” high risk facilities as “Level 8,” and maximum risk facilities as “Level 10,” for
simplicity’s sake we refer to minimum risk facilities as “Level 1” facilities, low risk facilities as “Level 2,” and so
on. Id.

residential (the juveniles committed to them are allowed to return home at night), and may
therefore be substantially different in nature from the other facilities. This suggests that an
analysis that compares the performance of facility management types across all restrictiveness
levels may not be comparing like facilities. Consequently, in the analyses that follow we restrict
our attention to the facilities in moderate and high restrictiveness levels (Levels 3 and 4) in order
to ensure maximum comparability.39 This restriction decreases the sample size to 5,322 youths.
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2 for the sample of individuals 17 years of
age or younger at the time of release from a Level 3 or a Level 4 facility. Seventy percent of
these individuals had a subsequent criminal charge and 51 percent had a subsequent adjudication
within one year of release. In most cases, the data provide the exact date of all recidivism
offenses, so for 2,660 individuals who had a subsequent adjudication within one year of release,
we were able to construct a time-until-recidivism variable (Survival Time)40 to reflect how long
each individual lasted before re-offending. The mean survival time for the recidivists in the
sample is 124 days. For the 3,703 individuals who were charged with a subsequent criminal
offense, our data also indicate the exact nature of the offense(s).41 The most common offense for
which individuals were subsequently charged is assault and battery (21 percent of the sample),
followed by felony weapon offenses (15 percent) and burglary (14 percent). The means of these
sixteen Recidivism - Charged criminal categories do not sum to 0.70 because most of the
recidivist youths were charged with multiple crimes.

39

In a previous version of this paper, we ran many of the same regressions without this restriction. Patrick Bayer &
David E. Pozen, The Effectiveness of Juvenile Correctional Facilities: Public versus Private Management
(Discussion Paper No. 863, Yale Univ. Economic Growth Center, July 2003). The results without this restriction
are largely similar, although restricting the analysis to the more direct comparison of Level 3 and Level 4 facilities
increases the magnitude and statistical significance of the results concerning facility management type in all cases.
40
Throughout the paper, the names of all variables used in regressions appear in italics.
41
Unfortunately, we were unable to adequately link adjudications after release with corresponding charges.
Consequently, we were unable to create distinct variables that characterize re-adjudication in specific crime
categories.

The criminal history variables in Table 2 reflect the categories of crimes for which
individuals were formally charged within the Florida system prior to placement in a correctional
facility during the evaluation period. The individual characteristics listed in Table 2 provide
basic information on the youths’ age, gender, race, and length of stay under their correctional
facility’s care.

The typical length of stay in a facility is a little over half a year.

The

neighborhood characteristics in this study all come from the 1990 Census of Population and
Housing except for Crime Rate in Zip, which comes directly from D.J.J. records on delinquency
referrals by zipcode. The facility and peer characteristics in Table 2 include information about
facilities’ restrictiveness level as well as cost and compositional information. Note that in the
discussion that follows we treat restrictiveness levels as both facility and individual
characteristics. This reflects the fact that each juvenile is explicitly assigned a restrictiveness
level by the judge, and is subsequently placed in a correctional facility that handles only
individuals in that restrictiveness category.
The last category of variables in Table 2, facility management type, characterizes
facilities as: State, For-profit, Nonprofit, or County. The State facilities are those directly
controlled by the D.J.J., while the County facilities are boot camps (primarily) and youth
development centers managed by county sheriff’s departments, with oversight from the D.J.J.42
The For-profit and Nonprofit facilities are all privately operated.

While privatization of

correctional facilities can take a variety of forms, for the purposes of this study a facility’s
management type is determined by its operational administration—whatever entity has total
operational administration of the facility, even if it does not own the facility, is deemed its
manager. The extent to which Florida’s juvenile justice system is privatized is reflected by the
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The State and County-operated facilities are therefore both publicly operated, but we consider them separately
because of their very different management structures. See discussion in Section IIA supra.

fact that 50 percent of the juvenile offenders in our sample were released from private nonprofit
correctional facilities, and 19 percent were released from private for-profit facilities (19 percent
and 12 percent were released from public D.J.J. facilities and county-operated facilities,
respectively).

The small number of juveniles who served sentences in adult correctional

facilities does not appear in this sample.
A final, important set of dummy variables—specifying which of Florida’s twenty
geographically-defined judicial circuit courts assigned an individual to the facility under study—
is not reported in Table 2.43 The inclusion of these variables in the analysis below controls for
regional variation in an individual’s propensity to recidivate, for variation in prosecutorial,
police, and sentencing practices across jurisdictions, and for any regional variation in the cost of
operating a correctional facility.

C.

Facility Characteristics by Management Type

Table 3 summarizes the key characteristics of the four facility management types. With
64 facilities, Nonprofit is by far the most common management type, and County is the least
common management type with 9 facilities. For-profit facilities have the highest recidivism
rates as measured both by charges and adjudications, and County facilities the lowest. For-profit
facilities also have the shortest mean Survival Time for those individuals who are re-adjudicated.
Without any consideration of individual characteristics, therefore, these measures would suggest
inferior recidivism performance by the For-profit facilities. Before drawing any conclusions
about the effects of facility management type on recidivism, however, it is important to control
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For information on Florida’s judicial circuit system for juvenile crime, see Florida Department of Juvenile Justice,
Juvenile Justice Organizational Fact Sheet, http://www.djj.state.fl.us/statsnresearch/factsheets/organization.html,
visited November 21, 2003; Florida Department of Juvenile Justice, Juvenile Justice Regional and Circuit Map,
http://www.djj.state.fl.us/agency/circ_region-key_map.pdf, visited November 21, 2003.

for differences in the backgrounds and offending histories of individuals assigned to each facility
management type, as these differences likely influence their propensity to recidivate.
Indeed, the next set of statistics in Table 3 immediately suggests that the For-profit
facilities serve the most challenging clients, followed by County facilities:

Compared to

releasees from these two management types, State and Nonprofit releasees have, on average,
fewer prior felony charges. The longer average Length of Stays and older average Age at Exits of
youths in For-profit and County facilities also likely derive, at least in part, from having more
serious offenders assigned to these facilities.44 The overall Cost per Release measure indicates
that State and Nonprofit facilities are more expensive to the D.J.J. on a per-capita basis than the
County and For-profit facilities. This cost differential does not seem to reflect the extra security
costs of maintaining a more dangerous inmate population, but it may derive from economies of
scale, as the cheaper County and For-profit facilities are substantially larger on average than the
other management types.45 Whether facility size should be used as a control variable or viewed
instead as the endogenous choice of the facility manager is a question we explore in detail
below.46
The final set of statistics in Table 3 indicates the prevalence of different facility
programming types across the four management type categories. The Florida D.J.J. classifies all
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The longer stays of youths in For-profit facilities may also derive, to an extent, from deliberate attempts by the
corporate operators to maintain occupancy by making it more difficult for inmates to accumulate the “good
behavior” points necessary for early release. See, for example, Burton A. Weisbrod, The Nonprofit Economy 40
(1988). In Florida, juvenile correctional facility operators have significant discretion to lengthen or shorten their
inmates’ length of stay. Judges recommend sentence lengths, but as the D.J.J. states on its website, “Juvenile
offenders are committed to [correctional] programs for an indeterminate length of time. They must complete an
individually designed treatment plan, based on their rehabilitative needs, as one of the requirements for release.
Basically if they follow the rules and change their behavior, they have a chance of getting out sooner.” Florida
Department
of
Juvenile
Justice,
Juvenile
Justice
Residential
&
Correctional
Facilities,
http://www.djj.state.fl.us/rescorrfacilities, visited November 21, 2003.
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Note that the mean facility size reported in Table 3 is averaged across facilities rather than individuals, which
explains why it does not match the overall mean reported in Table 2. All other means in Table 3 are reported for
individuals in facilities of the given management type.
46
See Section IIIG infra.

juvenile correctional facilities under its supervision not only by their restrictiveness level, but
also by their programming type. A facility’s programming type refers to the program of services
and activities it offers its inmates; correctional facilities with the same programming type tend to
have similar philosophies, guidelines, and strategies concerning their treatment of offenders. As
a result, including controls for programming type ought to go a long way towards isolating the
specific effects of facility management type on releasees’ recidivism behavior. Table 3 reveals
that most programming types in our sample are run under one or two management types, with
Nonprofit facilities host to the greatest number of programming types and County facilities the
least. Only youth development centers are operated by all four of the management types. Full
descriptions of each programming type are provided in the Appendix.

III. RESULTS
A. The Effect of Management Type on Recidivism
To predict recidivism, we use a linear probability model relating recidivism to facility
management type and other control variables, including variables that characterize criminal
history, individual attributes, neighborhood attributes, facility attributes, and judicial circuit
assignments.

In the analyses that follow, we consider multiple definitions of recidivism,

including (i) whether a releasee was subsequently adjudicated; (ii) whether a releasee was
subsequently charged with any crime; and (iii) whether a releasee was subsequently charged in
each of sixteen specific categories of crime.
Table 4 reports the parameter estimates for the facility management type variables for
various specifications of a regression that uses Recidivism - Adjudicated as the dependent
variable. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the facility level throughout the entire

analysis. The State, Nonprofit, and County coefficients are interpreted relative to the omitted
category: For-profit. The specification shown in the first column essentially restates information
from Table 3 in regression form.

Without controlling for any other characteristics of the

correctional facilities or their inmates, youths released from For-profit facilities have the highest
probability of being re-adjudicated—57.3 percent of them are re-adjudicated within one year of
release. Youths released from County and Nonprofit facilities are, respectively, 8.8 and 7.9
percentage points less likely to recidivate and these results are both statistically significant at the
5 percent level. Youths released from State facilities are 6.3 percentage points less likely to
recidivate (significant at the 10 percent level).
The second column in Table 4 controls for observable individual characteristics including
sex, race, age at first offense, age at exit, and the length of time in the facility. The third column
includes controls for the individual’s criminal history, including the number of prior felonies, the
nature of past crimes, and whether the restrictiveness level of his/her facility is moderate versus
high. This restrictiveness level, as it reflects the judge’s evaluation of the appropriate detention
environment for the individual, likely picks up aspects of an individual’s criminal history and
propensity to recidivate unobserved elsewhere in the data. The fourth column of Table 4 adds
controls for the individual’s home neighborhood, correctional facility, and peers while in
commitment. The neighborhood controls include the unemployment rate, the per capita income
in the neighborhood, the racial composition of the neighborhood, and the average youth crime
rate in the neighborhood. This last variable is particularly valuable since it controls for any
unobserved characteristics of the neighborhood that increase the likelihood of all youths in the
neighborhood to commit crime. The facility and peer variables control for the racial composition
of other juveniles in the same facility and the average number of days juveniles spend in the

facility. Finally, the fifth column of Table 4 includes additional controls for the judicial circuit in
which the individual was adjudicated prior to being assigned to the facility under evaluation.
The inclusion of this judicial circuit information, which provides a measure of control for
regional variation in an individual’s propensity to recidivate as well as variation in prosecutorial
and police practices across jurisdictions, has little effect on the parameter estimates.47
The estimates in the final column of Table 4 imply that relative to youths released from
For-profit facilities, comparable youths released from State facilities are 5.3 percentage points
less likely to be re-adjudicated within a year (statistically significant at the 5 percent level);
youths released from Nonprofit facilities are 6.0 percentage points less likely to be re-adjudicated
(statistically significant at the 1 percent level); and youths released from County facilities are 7.1
percentage points less likely to be re-adjudicated (statistically significant at the 5 percent level).
Confirming the intuition provided in Table 3, the change in parameter estimates from column 1
to column 5 of Table 4 implies that, relative to the other management types, For-profit facilities
are indeed assigned individuals more likely to recidivate on the basis of observable
characteristics. Yet since the estimates for the facility management type coefficients decline
only 15 to 25 percent from the first to the fifth column, it appears that observable differences in
individual, facility, neighborhood, and regional variables across facilities operated by different
management types explain only a small portion of the raw differences in recidivism.
Table 5 replicates the analyses performed in Table 4 using Recidivism - Charged as the
dependent variable instead of Recidivism - Adjudicated. The coefficients in this case are slightly
larger than those reported in Table 4, consistent with the additional likelihood that individuals
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The inclusion of the judicial circuit information does, however, significantly raise the predictive power of the
model, to an unadjusted R² value of .075. In general, recidivism at the individual level is difficult to predict, so
these low R² values are not surprising. See Champion, supra note 20, at 83 (discussing the low predictive ability of
existing models of recidivism risk).

are charged with a subsequent crime within a year of release (70 percent) relative to being readjudicated (51 percent). Again, the coefficients decline only slightly from the first to the final
column as the full set of controls is included in the regression. The final estimates for the facility
management type coefficients in column 5 of Table 5 imply that relative to youths released from
For-profit facilities, comparable youths released from State, Nonprofit, and County facilities are,
respectively, 7.3, 5.8, and 8.5 percentage points less likely to be charged for a criminal offense
within a year of release. All of these estimates are statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
These results provide additional support for the conclusion that State, Nonprofit, and County
facilities are more effective at reducing recidivism than For-profit ones.

B.

More General Predictors of Recidivism

Table 6 provides estimates for the full specification used to generate column 5 of Table
4.48 A number of interesting results emerge. Compared to otherwise identical males, female
releasees are 16 percentage points less likely to be re-adjudicated. Black juveniles are 14
percentage points more likely to recidivate, although it is important to point out that race may
stand in for other socio-economic differences in this case. The two age variables have a small
but significant effect on youths’ recidivism risk: Youths who are released at a younger age and
who committed their first criminal offense at a younger age are more likely to be re-adjudicated
(within a fixed time period). The length of a youth’s stay in a correctional facility, however,
does not seem to have a discernible effect on his or her recidivism behavior, likely because a

48

In its P.A.M. report using the same cohort of offenders as our study does, the Florida D.J.J. identified four factors
as significant to a youth’s probability of recidivating—gender, age at release, age at first adjudication, and number
of prior adjudications—and used only these four risk factors in its regressions. Florida Department of Juvenile
Justice, 2001 Program Accountability Measures Report, supra note 27, at 30. We also found these four factors to
have a significant impact on recidivism risk, but we found number of prior felonies to be a better predictor of
recidivism than number of prior adjudications and numerous other factors to significantly predict recidivism as well.

youth’s restrictiveness level assignment and criminal history already adequately capture the
effect of past offenses on his/her propensity to recidivate.
Recidivism is, by and large, an increasing function of the number of prior felonies, with
youths with seven or more prior felonies 8.0 percentage points more likely to recidivate than
those without any prior felonies—and this is over and above the effect of the particular prior
felonies included in the analysis. Of the specific crime categories included, a history of felony
drug offenses, auto theft, petty larceny, or prior escapes from correctional facilities makes an
individual especially more likely to recidivate (beyond having an additional prior felony more
generally). The neighborhood characteristics, including the neighborhood youth crime rate, have
very little predictive power once the set of individual and criminal history variables are
incorporated into the analysis. These neighborhood results provide more evidence that the final
specification shown in column 5 of Table 4 is fairly robust to additional selection bias, as one
would certainly expect these variables to have predictive power in the absence of sufficient
controls for the individual’s own recidivism risk.49 Of the facility and peer characteristics,
exposure to peers who have longer average commitments has a negative effect on recidivism.

C.

Recidivism in Specific Crime Categories

Using information on the exact offense(s) with which the recidivists in the sample were
charged, Table 7 reports results for sixteen separate crime categories across the facility
management types. This analysis augments those of the previous tables, as it reveals the precise
criminal areas in which different management types have better or worse performance. Note that
these totals need not sum to the total effect shown in Table 5 as individuals can be charged in
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Indeed, these variables are highly significant in regressions including only neighborhood controls.

multiple categories. Also note that full controls, including the judicial circuit dummies, are
included in all regressions.
Significant performance differentials arise in a number of important crime categories.
Relative to otherwise identical youths released from For-profit facilities, youths released from
State facilities are significantly less likely to be charged with assault and battery, felony weapon
offenses, felony sex offenses, auto theft, petty larceny, or trespassing; youths released from
Nonprofit facilities are significantly less likely to be charged with felony sex offenses, auto theft,
robbery, or trespassing; and youths released from County facilities are significantly less likely to
be charged with felony drug offenses, felony sex offenses, auto theft, burglary, petty larceny,
robbery, or trespassing. These results suggest that certain management types may be particularly
well suited to dealing with (that is, decreasing the likelihood of) certain categories of recidivism
crimes: County facilities, for example, seem especially successful at reducing felony drug
offenses, burglary, and petty larceny among their releasees. In no criminal area are releasees
from For-profit facilities significantly less likely to recidivate than comparable releasees from a
facility of a different management type.50

D.

50

Survival Analysis

In a previous version of this paper, we also considered a specification of the basic recidivism regression that
allowed for interactions between facility management type and five key individual characteristics—gender, race, age
at exit, age at first offense, and length of stay—in order to examine whether certain types of individuals fare better
or worse under specific management types. See Bayer & Pozen, supra note 39, at Table 11. Our notable findings
included: males do relatively better in For-profit facilities, while females do relatively better in all other types of
facilities; black individuals do relatively better in State and (especially) Nonprofit facilities; older individuals do
relatively better in State facilities; and, perhaps most interestingly, otherwise identical individuals serving longer
versus shorter sentences are less likely to recidivate when released from For-profit facilities, so that individuals
serving especially long sentences actually have better recidivism results on average when released from For-profit
facilities. Given the facilities’ ability to lengthen or shorten an offender’s sentenced commitment period, this
finding might mitigate concern over the possible financial incentives of for-profit facilities to extend commitments
artificially. See discussion in note 44 supra.

Table 8 reports results for various specifications based on an analysis of survival time.
These specifications are able to glean additional information from the precise timing of
recidivism in the first year, which leads to more precise estimates of the relative effectiveness of
the different facility management types. The first column reports the result of a proportional
hazards model, while the second and third columns present alternative specifications of column 1
assuming, respectively, Weibull and exponential distributions. All three specifications include
the full set of control variables, including judicial circuit dummies, and use adjudications as the
measure of recidivism.
The results are consistent across the three specifications: In all cases, youths released
from State, Nonprofit, and County facilities have significantly lower daily hazard rates than
comparable releasees from For-profit facilities. Releasees from State, Nonprofit, and County
facilities have hazard rates approximately 13, 17, and 19 percent lower, respectively, than
otherwise identical individuals released from For-profit facilities.

These estimates are

significant at the 5, 1, and 5 percent levels, respectively, and again imply that For-profit facilities
have systematically worse recidivism performance.

E.

Costs to the State

While For-profit correctional facilities perform worse than State, Nonprofit, and County
facilities with respect to recidivism, they may still be desirable as a public policy tool if they
come at a cheaper cost to the state.51 The Florida D.J.J.’s data also provide information on each
facility’s average cost to the state per release. Cost in this instance is defined as the annual
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In adult corrections, the Florida Legislature requires that for-profit facilities come at a cheaper cost to the state.
By law, the Florida Correctional Privatization Commission “may not enter into a contract [with a corporate operator]
… unless [it] determines that the contract or series of contracts in total for the facility will result in a cost savings to
the state of at least seven percent over the public provision of a similar facility.” Fla. Stat. Ann. § 957.07(1) (1993).

amount spent by the Florida D.J.J.;52 it averages approximately $24,089 per release. With the
average individual having spent 194 days in a facility, this works out to $124 per day. The final
column of Table 8 reports the results of a regression of the average cost to the state per release
on the full set of control variables. In this case, the regression is run at the facility level,
weighted by the number of individuals released from each facility and controlling for facility
averages for the full set of controls included in the recidivism regressions.
The results imply that For-Profit facilities do in fact generally require a smaller outlay by
the Florida D.J.J. per release, once the characteristics of the facilities and the individuals
assigned to these facilities are taken into account. Specifically, the D.J.J. pays $11,563 more
annually per the release of a comparable individual from State facilities and $6,123 more per
release from Nonprofit facilities relative to For-profit facilities. These results are statistically
significant at the 1 percent level. Comparable releases from County facilities cost the D.J.J.
$2,760 more annually on average than For-profit releases, though this result is not statistically
significant. The difference between these estimates and the raw differences in costs reported in
Table 3 suggest that For-profit facilities are handling more costly juveniles in terms of
observable characteristics. The coefficients on the controls in the cost regression imply, for
example, that individuals with more felonies are more costly to house in a correctional facility.
Some of these additional costs may be related to the increased difficulty of rehabilitating these
individuals while other costs may be related to greater security precautions they require.
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Data were not available on other possible sources of public funding for the correctional facilities, such as federal
grants or local school board allocations. D.J.J. expenditures represent the bulk of all the facilities’ public funding,
however. Apart from public funding, private for-profit and non-profit correctional facilities may have other sources
of income available to them; for-profit facilities can potentially draw on investment income and budget allocations
from their parent corporations, while nonprofit facilities can potentially draw on donations, grants, and endowment
income. Since we do not have information on these possible extra-governmental income flows, our results reflect
only facilities’ cost-effectiveness from the perspective of the Florida D.J.J.

F.

Programming Type

In order to understand better why recidivism performance and costs differ across
management types, Table 9 shows results for our main specifications after controlling for facility
programming type—each facility’s self-determined set of philosophies and practices. Column 1
of Table 9 is comparable to column 5 of Table 4; column 2 is comparable to column 5 of Table
5; column 3 is comparable to column 1 of Table 8; and column 4 is comparable to column 4 of
Table 8. Once again, For-profit is the omitted management type category, and Boot Camp is the
omitted programming type category. In all four of the specifications, the results for State and
Nonprofit facilities remain quite similar to those reported in the previous tables:

These

management types continue to have significantly superior recidivism performance to that of Forprofit facilities using all measures, and they continue to cost more to the state per comparable
individual released. In the case of County facilities, on the other hand, adding the programming
type controls changes the results substantially. Now, the recidivism performance of County
facilities becomes statistically indistinguishable from that of For-profit facilities, but their cost
per release becomes far lower—an annual average of $26,047 less per comparable release
relative to For-profit facilities. It is important to point out, however, that since all County
facilities have only one of two programming types, Youth Development Center or Boot Camp,
these results simply reflect how the single youth development center operated by a county
compares to the youth development centers operated by the other management types.
Interpreted relative to the case of boot camps, the results in the lower part of Table 9
indicate the relative effectiveness of the different programming types.

The recidivism

performance of boot camps looks very good, as all of the other major programming types have
statistically inferior recidivism performance on at least one measure and in most cases on all

three. These better returns in terms of recidivism do come at an increased cost, though, as the
other programming types typically cost the state much less than boot camps. More generally, it
is important to keep in mind that all of the boot camps operated in Florida are County. Thus, to
evaluate the performance of Florida’s boot camps relative to other programming types run by a
different management type, one must weigh the combined effect of Boot Camp versus another
programming type and County versus another management type. In most comparisons, Florida’s
boot camps give rise to substantial decreases in recidivism rates at an increased cost easily
justifiable by a cost-benefit analysis.

G.

Facility Size

In order to shed further light on why recidivism performance and costs differ across
management types, Table 10 explores the impact of including facility size as a further control.53
As Table 3 makes clear, one of the key differences between For-profit and County facilities
versus State and Nonprofit facilities is the relatively large size of For-profit and County facilities.
In conducting our analyses, therefore, an interesting question arises concerning how to treat
facility size. On the one hand, facility size might be thought of as an endogenous choice of the
facility manager. If increased size allows the facility manager to reduce per-capita costs at the
possible expense of greater rates of recidivism, it would not be appropriate to include facility size
as a control variable.

On the other hand, if one assumes facility size is correlated with

unobserved individual characteristics or is simply pre-determined by the D.J.J., one might want
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As yet another way to explore the possible factors behind our recidivism results, we also conducted an analysis of
the “best and worst” facilities in our sample, where we compared facilities’ actual Recidivism - Adjudicated rates to
the rates predicted by the regression reported in Table 6 without including the facility management variables, and
then ranked the facilities on the basis of that differential. These results were broadly consistent with the relative
prevalence and overall recidivism performance of each management type, and they indicated that our primary
recidivism results are not driven by a few particularly excellent or substandard facilities in one or more of the
management type categories.

to use facility size as an extra control variable. Thus, in order to provide a clear picture of the
extent to which this latter assumption would affect our results, Table 10 repeats the analyses of
Table 9 controlling for facility size.
As one might have expected, smaller facilities produce significantly better results with
respect to recidivism at a significantly higher cost. Yet while part of the differences between the
performance of For-profit facilities and the performance of State and Nonprofit facilities can
therefore be explained by size differences, size differences do not explain very much; when
facility size is added as a control, the results for State and Nonprofit facilities are broadly similar
to before. The magnitudes and statistically significance of their coefficients generally decline
relative to their levels in Table 9, but these two management types continue to outperform Forprofit facilities by a wide margin in terms of recidivism while costing more to the D.J.J. In a
more considerable change from Table 9, County facilities’ Recidivism - Adjudicated performance
becomes significantly better than that of For-profit facilities with the inclusion of the facility size
control. The cost savings offered to the D.J.J. by County facilities over For-profit facilities,
meanwhile, is halved but remains substantial at $12,476 annually per comparable individual
released.
Overall, then, when facility size and programming type are both added to the full set of
controls, State and Nonprofit facilities continue to have substantially better recidivism
performance than For-profit facilities, but they come at a higher cost to the state. County
facilities also offer better recidivism performance than For-profit facilities, and they come at a
lower cost to the state. County facilities therefore seem clearly preferable to For-profit facilities
from the perspective of the D.J.J., while a more precise cost-benefit analysis is necessary to

determine whether the recidivism benefits of State and Nonprofit facilities justify their additional
costs relative to For-Profit facilities.

IV.

COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS

Taken together, the results presented above imply that For-profit management leads to a
statistically significant increase in recidivism but at significantly lower costs when compared to
Nonprofit and especially to State facilities. This raises an interesting question for public policy:
Are the immediate cost savings offered by For-Profit facilities enough to justify the future costs
associated with increased recidivism? To provide a better sense of the magnitudes involved in
this trade-off, Table 11 presents a comparison of the costs and benefits of the different
management types.
Our cost-benefit analysis is conducted for the mean individual (15.8 years of age) in the
sample used in the analyses presented above (17 years of age or less at the time of release from a
moderate or high risk facility). We calculate the expected number of future days that this
individual, having been released from a facility operated by each of the four management types,
would spend in a correctional facility. We then divide the estimated cost differential between
management types by this result to arrive at a cutoff value of an expected future day in a
correctional facility needed to justify one type of facility versus another. To determine which of
these facility types should be preferred, this cutoff value must be compared to the social benefit
of avoiding an additional day in confinement (including the avoided costs of the crime and
prosecution as well as the cost of confinement).54
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For estimates of the costs of juvenile crime (and hence also of the benefits of reduced juvenile recidivism rates),
see, for example, Howard N. Snyder & Melissa Sickmund, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention,
U.S. Department of Justice, Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1999 National Report 82-83 (1999); David A.
Anderson, The Aggregate Burden of Crime, 42 J. Law & Econ. 611 (1999).

For this analysis, we seek to provide a lower bound regarding the benefits of other facility
management types versus For-profit and therefore make assumptions that are either neutral to or
favor For-profit management in comparison to other management types. First, the calculation of
future days in a correctional facility assumes a sentence length of 195 days, equal to the mean
sentence length in the current sample. This is clearly a lower bound, given that sentences will
subsequently be assigned to older individuals with more criminal experience. Second, the
calculation assumes that once released from each type of facility, an individual, while still a
juvenile, recidivates according to the mean hazard rate associated with that management type,
conditional on the full set of controls used in the analysis reported in Table 8. Once over 18
years of age, the mean individual becomes an adult in Florida’s criminal justice system; we
report results following two assumptions regarding recidivism rates as an adult. In the first
instance (Assumption 1), we assume that recidivism rates fall by one-third between the ages of
18 to 21 relative to the ages of 16 to 18. This assumption is consistent with the decline over time
in recidivism rates for all state prison releasees in Florida and serves to minimize differences in
future recidivism rates across facility management types.55 In the second instance (Assumption
2), we assume that differences in recidivism rates remain as they are for juveniles in our sample.
Finally, we allow for the possibility of multiple recidivistic commitments to a correctional
facility. In this case, we continue to apply the same hazard rate to an individual that was
associated with the original facility management type. This too is a conservative assumption
regarding differences between For-Profit and other management types, as we assume that the
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Florida Department of Corrections, Recidivism Report: Inmates Released from Florida Prisons July 1995 to June
2001 10-11 (Chart 1) (July 2003), available at http://www.dc.state.fl.us/pub/recidivism/2003/full.pdf, visited
November 21, 2003.

fact that an individual recidivates once has no effect on the individual’s subsequent recidivism
rate, future sentence length, or the future costs of confinement.
Turning to the results, the second panel of Table 11 indicates that individuals released
from For-profit facilities are expected to spend an average of 223 additional days in a
correctional facility by their 18th birthday, 2.2 years in the future. This figure reflects the fact
that well over half of such individuals recidivate within a year and, consequently, that a
significant number will have recidivated twice within this 2.2-year period.

A comparable

individual released from a Nonprofit facility is expected to spend only 194 future days back in a
correctional facility. Assuming that recidivism rates decline by one-third between the ages of
18-21 (Assumption 1), which is our preferred assumption, we estimate that individuals released
from State, Nonprofit, and County facilities will spend an average of 44, 58, and 66 fewer future
days in a correctional facility, respectively, relative to comparable individuals released from Forprofit facilities. The corresponding numbers generated under Assumption 2 are even larger.
The final panel reports the cutoff value of an additional day spent out of a correctional
facility needed to justify the choice of State, Nonprofit, and County facilities over For-profit
facilities. Following the more conservative Assumption 1, the results imply that five years after
release the cutoff value of an additional day spent out of a correctional facility needs to be $266,
$105, and $42 to justify the choice of a State, Nonprofit, and County facility, respectively, over a
For-profit facility. To provide a benchmark from our data, the average daily direct cost to the
Florida D.J.J. for the juveniles in our sample is $124 per day in a correctional facility. Thus,
even without accounting for any of the other possible benefits (both private and social) of
avoiding recidivism as well as the direct costs of apprehension and prosecution, County facilities

emerge as clearly preferable for the D.J.J. to For-profit and State facilities on the basis of cost
savings related to future time spent in a correctional facility.
The results of our analysis for the Nonprofit-versus-For-profit comparison come within a
standard deviation of the benchmark $124 cost to the state of a future day spent in a correctional
facility. This benchmark, however, does not include any of the benefits of a reduction in crime
except for cost savings from avoided confinement.

Moreover, as described above, our

methodology is conservative in many other dimensions. Consequently, the analysis clearly
points to the conclusion that the Nonprofit facilities are preferable to the For-profit ones from the
point-of-view of the state. It is not possible to reach a strong conclusion regarding State
management versus For-profit management since it would depend on what the full social
benefits of avoiding future recidivism are. The results of Table 11 do imply, however, that
Nonprofit and County facilities dominate State facilities, as they provide slightly better
recidivism performance at a substantially lower cost.56

V. CONCLUSION
The results of our analysis indicate that for-profit management has a statistically
significant impact on recidivism as measured by both one-year recidivism rates (approximately 5
to 8 percent higher than the other management types in terms of adjudications and charges) and
by daily hazard rates (approximately 13 to 19 percent higher). However, for-profit management
is also associated with significantly lower costs when compared to nonprofit and especially to
state-operated (Department of Juvenile Justice-operated) facilities—about $6,000 and $11,500
56

A comparable cost-benefit analysis based on the results reported in Table 10, which control for facility size and
programming type, leads to the same pattern of cutoff values as those in Table 11. This finding again indicates the
clearly superior performance of County-operated management versus For-profit management and provides a point
estimate of the cutoff value between Nonprofit and For-profit management remarkably similar to that reported in
Table 11.

per release less than the average cost for a comparable release from a nonprofit and a stateoperated facility, respectively.
Consistent with economic theory,57 we thus find a trade-off between the benefits of
reduced recidivism provided by nonprofit and state management on the one hand and the cost
savings associated with for-profit management on the other; in order to determine the relative
attractiveness of each correctional facility management type, this trade-off requires a more
careful analysis of the magnitudes of these effects.58 Using a series of conservative assumptions
concerning the future impact of the estimated differences in recidivism rates across management
types, our cost-benefit analysis implies that the short-run savings offered by for-profit facilities
over nonprofit facilities are reversed in the long-run due to increased recidivism rates. This
conclusion holds even if one ignores all the other possible benefits (both private and social) of
reducing criminal activity and measures the benefits of reduced recidivism as only the avoided
costs of additional confinement. County management outperforms for-profit management both
in terms of recidivism and in terms of (direct) cost, and therefore appears clearly preferable for
the State of Florida. While state management yields both worse recidivism performance and
higher costs than nonprofit and county management, the cost-benefit analysis is inconclusive
regarding a comparison of state and for-profit management.
While the possibility remains that unobserved differences in the populations served by
each facility management type explain some of the differences attributed to these management
types, several components of our analysis provide assurance that such unobserved differences
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See discussion in Section IB supra.
Of course, in determining the relative attractiveness of any facility management type, corrections officials might
take into account many considerations other than recidivism and cost, such as facilities’ quality of confinement and
the quality of their educational, vocational, rehabilitative, and health services. As the Florida D.J.J. recognizes,
however, recidivism and cost are fundamental considerations in shaping a corrections system. See, for example,
Florida Department of Juvenile Justice, The 2003 PAM Report, supra note 15.

58

would be unlikely to change the qualitative nature of our results. First, this study includes far
more controls for individual, criminal history, judge-assigned restrictiveness level, judicial
circuit, facility programming type, neighborhood, and peer characteristics than any previous
study of juvenile recidivism.

Considering that the inclusion of these numerous important

controls reduces the raw differences between management types by only 10 to 30 percent across
multiple recidivism measures, it appears highly improbable that remaining unobserved
differences in commitment populations explain the estimated differences between facility
management types.
These findings have immediate implications for public policy. Certainly, the Florida
Department of Juvenile Justice should continue to expand the role of county-operated facilities
(which are usually boot camps) and private nonprofit facilities in its portfolio of correctional
facilities relative to the role of private for-profit and state-operated facilities. Given the many
legal, political, and ethical complications associated with profit-seeking correctional facilities,59
it seems easy to recommend a movement away from for-profit facilities in Florida’s juvenile
justice system. Moreover, given that the Florida D.J.J. explicitly evaluates facilities on the basis
of recidivism and costs—thereby providing some incentive for at least the worst-performing
facilities to reduce recidivism—the performance of for-profit facilities in jurisdictions that do not
collect data and evaluate facilities on the basis of recidivism is likely to be even worse.
The results also suggest that certain facility management types may be particularly well
suited to decreasing the likelihood of certain categories of recidivism crimes. County-operated
59

For representative scholarly critiques of private prisons, see, for example, David Shichor, Punishment for Profit:
Private Prisons/Public Concerns (1995); Eric Bates, Private Prisons, The Nation, January 5, 1998, at 13; John J.
DiIulio, Jr., What’s Wrong with Private Prisons, 92 Pub. Int. 66 (1988); Joseph E. Field, Making Prisons Private: An
Improper Delegation of a Governmental Power, 15 Hofstra L. Rev. 649 (1987); J. Robert Lilly & Paul Knepper, The
Corrections-Commercial Complex, 39 Crime & Delinq. 150 (1993); Robert G. Porter, The Privatisation of Prisons
in the United States: A Policy That Britain Should Not Emulate, 29 Howard J. Crim. Just. 65 (1990); Mick Ryan &
Tony Ward, Privatization and the Penal System: Britain Misinterprets the American Experience, 14 Crim. Just. Rev.
1 (1989).

facilities, for example, are especially successful at reducing felony drug offenses, burglary, and
petty larceny among their releasees, while state-operated facilities are especially successful at
reducing future assault and battery and felony weapon offenses. For-profit facilities do not
exhibit superior recidivism performance in any of the sixteen criminal categories, which suggests
that their weaknesses in reducing recidivism are systematic.

APPENDIX
PROGRAMMING TYPE DESCRIPTIONS60
Wilderness and Work Programs provide services for youths committed by the juvenile
court as well as youths tried as adults and sentenced back to the juvenile system. Programs
maintain a population of approximately 20 to 25 males between the ages of 15 and 18 years.
They operate in an environmentally secure setting in a remote, isolated rural location. They
provide academic and vocational training with moderate overlay services such as mental health
and drug abuse treatment. The programs also emphasize outdoor activities, labor-intensive work
projects, and behavior management. The designed length of stay is 12 months.
Halfway Houses each serve a population of approximately 15 to 30 youths of the same
gender between the ages of 14 and 18 years. These programs serve youths who have committed
first-degree misdemeanors, felonies, or similar offenses and are classified as moderate risks to
public safety. The programs provide an intentional therapeutic environment based on control
theory, structured learning, and behavior management techniques that emphasize social skills,
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Except for the descriptions of boot camps, forestry youth academies, and out-of-state programs, the following
descriptions of programming types all come from one Florida Department of Juvenile Justice report. Florida
Department of Juvenile Justice, 2000 Outcome Evaluation Report, supra note 37, app.1, at 11-15 (2000). Some
descriptions are adapted slightly.

academics, pre-vocational and vocational training, and life skills. The designed length of stay is
three to six months.
Intensive Halfway Houses each serve a population of approximately 15 to 30 offenders
between the ages of 14 and 18 years. These programs provide services at the high restrictiveness
level similar to those provided by a halfway house at the moderate restrictiveness level. In
addition to more intense physical, staff, and procedural security, there is also increased structure
and behavioral management to maximize protection of the public. The designed length of stay
ranges from six to nine months.
Serious or Habitual Offender Programs each provide services for a population of no
more than 25 males who are serious or habitual offenders. These programs are designed for
youths ages 14 to 19 years. These programs employ physical security features and procedures to
ensure protection of the public.

The services provided by these programs are statutorily

mandated and the designed length of stay is nine to twelve months.
Youth Development Centers include programs formerly known as training schools. These
large institutions serve more than 100 youths of the same gender ranging from 13 to 18 years of
age who have committed felonies of violent misdemeanors. Youths who have committed sex
offenses are not eligible for admission. These programs provide a high degree of physical and
staff security. Minimum security features include a security perimeter fence at least twelve feet
high with an inside overhang or razor wire; external facility doors that are accessed electronically
or through the use of a key; passage doors that are hardware secure; and windows that must be
secure and constructed of break-resistant material. These programs provide services through a
multi-disciplinary approach within an institutional setting.

Services include behavior

management, academics, vocational training, mental health and substance abuse treatment,
physical fitness activities, and health care. The designed length of stay is nine months.
Boot Camps61 are designed as a series of phases. Each camp includes a high-intensity
intake on the first day. The next ten to fourteen days, called the forming stage, is an orientation
period during which the recruits are oriented to the basics of military protocol and the rules and
regulations of the facility. Once orientation has been completed, educational, mental health, and
other overlay services are added. Other features of boot camps include: a silence rule (recruits
may not speak to one another except under special circumstances); individual rooms; military
bearing, discipline, drill, ceremony, and physical training; long, structured days with little or no
free time or recreation; a minimum of five hours a day of education; use of different colored hats
to designate progress through the program; and transition programs at the end of recruits’ stay in
order to prepare them for return to “civilian life.” Boot camps are typically all-male.
Therapeutic Wilderness Camps each provide services for a population of approximately
30 to 50 emotionally disturbed all-male or all-female youths, generally ages 11 to 16 years. The
programs are designed to provide a camp environment that emphasizes outdoor experiential
learning, structured peer interaction, teamwork, and personal accountability.

The designed

length of stay ranges from 12 to 18 months.
Special Needs Programs each serve a population of approximately 10 to 30 youths of the
same gender between the ages of 13 and 18 years. These programs provide specialized clinical
treatments services in the areas of substance abuse, mental health, developmental disability, or
sexual behavior dysfunction. The designed length of stay ranges from 4 to 6 months.
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Florida Department of Juvenile Justice, Bureau of Data and Research, Determining Best Practices in Florida’s
Juvenile Boot Camps 12 (November 2000), available at http://www.djj.state.fl.us/RnD/mr/2000-11/2000-11.pdf,
visited November 21, 2003.

Sexual Offender Programs provide services for approximately 20 to 30 male sexual
offenders ranging in age from 14 to 18 years. These programs provide a continuum of treatment
services specifically tailored to the needs of sexual offenders, and focus on overcoming denial,
treatment of maladaptive thought patterns, and alleviating or reducing dysfunctional sexual
behaviors. The designed length of stay ranges from six to twelve months.
The Forestry Youth Academy62 functions as a secondary, optional phase to boot camp
facilities and is under the arm of the Department of Juvenile Justice. Candidates for the two-year
program are approximately 16 years old, have successfully graduated from a boot camp facility,
and have been pre-screened by the D.J.J. At this moderate risk facility, education and life skills
are linked with discipline and teamwork. Participants receive credit-bearing vocational training
in practical forestry skills utilizing the latest technology and nontraditional methodology to
ensure the greatest chance of employability upon graduation. Graduates leave the program with
a G.E.D. or high school diploma, along with a vocational certification.
Out of State programs refer to The Glen Mills Schools,63 a private, residential school in
Pennsylvania for court-adjudicated male delinquents between 15 and 18 years of age. Students
are referred to the school by state departments of juvenile justice throughout the country,
including the Florida D.J.J. The school has two basic mandates for students: to change behavior
from anti-social to pro-social, and to develop life skills that will help sustain this change. Each
student receives year-round instruction designed to meet his educational needs.
Intensive Residential Treatment programs are for offenders between the ages of 10 and
13 years. These programs provide services for a population of approximately 25 young males
who have committed serious felony offenses, including capital or life felonies.
62

Florida
Division
of
Forestry,
Forestry
Youth
Academy,
dof.com/About_Forestry/youth_academy.html, visited November 21, 2003.
63
The Glen Mills Schools, http://www.glenmillsschool.org, visited November 21, 2003.

Statutory

http://www.fl-

provisions allow the programs to retain youths until age 21 when necessary. The programs
provide intensive treatment services that address the areas of education, behavior management,
substance abuse, mental health, sexual behavior dysfunction, life skills, gang-related behavior,
and family issues. The designed length of stay ranges from nine to twelve months.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Anderson, David A. “The Aggregate Burden of Crime.” Journal of Law and Economics 42
(1999): 611-42.
Archambeault, William G., and Deis, Donald R., Jr. Cost Effectiveness Comparisons of Private
versus Public Prisons in Louisiana: A Comprehensive Analysis of Allen, Avoyelles, and Winn
Correctional Centers. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University School of Social Work, 1996.
Armstrong, Gaylene Styve. Private vs. Public Operation of Juvenile Correctional Facilities.
New York: LFB Scholarly Publishing, 2001.
Avio, Kenneth L. “The Economics of Prisons.” European Journal of Law and Economics 6
(1998): 143-75.
Bakal, Yitzhak, and Lowell, Harvey. “The Private Sector in Juvenile Corrections.” Pages 196213 in Juvenile Justice and Public Policy: Toward a National Agenda, edited by Ira M.
Schwartz. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1992.
Bates, Eric. “Private Prisons.” The Nation (January 5, 1998): 11-18.
Bayer, Patrick, and Pozen, David E. The Effectiveness of Juvenile Correctional Facilities:
Public versus Private Management. Discussion paper number 863. New Haven: Economic
Growth Center, Yale University, 2003.
Borna, Shaneen. “Free Enterprise Goes to Prison.” British Journal of Criminology 26 (1986):
321-34.
Champion, Dean J. Measuring Offender Risk: A Criminal Justice Sourcebook. Westport, Conn.:
Greenwood Press, 1994.
Curran, Daniel J. “Destructuring, Privatization, and the Promise of Juvenile Diversion:
Compromising Community-Based Corrections.” Crime & Delinquency 34 (1988): 363-84.
DiIulio, John J., Jr. “What’s Wrong with Private Prisons.” Public Interest 92 (1988): 66-83.

DiPiano, John G. “Private Prisons: Can They Work? Panopticon in the Twenty-first Century.”
New England Journal on Criminal and Civil Confinement 21 (1995): 171-202.
Field, Joseph E. “Making Prisons Private: An Improper Delegation of a Government Power.”
Hofstra Law Review 15 (1987): 649-75.
Florida Department of Corrections. Recidivism Report: Inmates Released from Florida Prisons
July 1995 to June 2001. Tallahassee: Florida Department of Corrections, 2003.
Florida Department of Corrections, Bureau of Research and Data Analysis. Preliminary
Assessment of a Study Entitled: “A Comparative Recidivism Analysis of Releasees from Public
and Private Prisons in Florida.” Tallahassee: Florida Department of Corrections, 1998.
Florida Department of Juvenile Justice. “Juvenile Justice Organizational Fact Sheet.”
http://www.djj.state.fl.us/statsnresearch/factsheets/organization.html, visited November 21,
2003.
Florida Department of Juvenile Justice. “Juvenile Justice Regional and Circuit Map.”
http://www.djj.state.fl.us/agency/circ_region-key_map.pdf, visited November 21, 2003.
Florida Department of Juvenile Justice. “Juvenile Justice Residential & Correctional Facilities.”
http://www.djj.state.fl.us/rescorrfacilities, visited November 21, 2003.
Florida Department of Juvenile Justice, Bureau of Data and Research. “A Profile of Recruits
Admitted to Department of Juvenile Justice Boot Camp Programs Between Inception and March
15, 1997.” Research Digest 1 (1997): 1-2. Tallahassee: Florida Department of Juvenile Justice.
Florida Department of Juvenile Justice, Bureau of Data and Research. 2000 Outcome Evaluation
Report. Management Report Number 2000-7. Tallahassee: Florida Department of Juvenile
Justice, 2000.
Florida Department of Juvenile Justice, Bureau of Data and Research. Determining Best
Practices in Florida’s Juvenile Boot Camps.
Management Report Number 2000-11.
Tallahassee: Florida Department of Juvenile Justice, 2000.
Florida Department of Juvenile Justice, Bureau of Data and Research. 2001 Program
Accountability Measures Report: A Two-Year Analysis. Management Report Number 2001-4.
Tallahassee: Florida Department of Juvenile Justice, 2001.
Florida Department of Juvenile Justice, Justice Research Center, Inc. The 2003 PAM Report: A
Two-Year Analysis. Management Report Number 03-01. Tallahassee: Florida Department of
Juvenile Justice, 2002.
Florida Division of Forestry.
“Forestry Youth Academy.”
dof.com/About_Forestry/youth_academy.html, visited November 21, 2003.

http://www.fl-

Gaes, Gerald G.; Camp, Scott D.; and Saylor, William G. “The Performance of Privately
Operated Prisons: A Review of Research.” Appendix 2 in Private Prisons in the United States:
An Assessment of Current Practice, edited by Douglas McDonald, Elizabeth Fournier, Malcolm
Russell-Einhorn, and Stephen Crawford. Cambridge, Mass.: Abt Associates, Inc., 1998.
Glen Mills Schools. http://www.glenmillsschool.org, visited November 21, 2003.
Greenwood, Peter W.; Turner, Susan; and Rosenblatt, Kathy. Evaluation of Paint Creek Youth
Center: Preliminary Results. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1989.
Harding, Richard. “Private Prisons.” Pages 265-346 in Crime and Justice: A Review of
Research, Vol. 28, edited by Michael Tonry. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001.
Harrison, Paige M., and Beck, Allen J. Prisoners in 2001. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department
of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2002.
Hart, Oliver; Schleifer, Andrei; and Vishny, Robert W. “The Proper Scope of Government:
Theory and an Application to Prisons.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 (1997): 1127-63.
Hatry, Harry P.; Brounstein, Paul J.; Levinson, Robert B.; Altschuler, David M.; Chi, Keon; and
Rosenberg, P. Philip. Comparison of Privately and Publicly Operated Correctional Facilities in
Kentucky and Massachusetts. Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1989.
Koch Crime Institute. Juvenile Boot Camps and Military Structured Youth Programs: 2000
Directory. Topeka, Kans.: Koch Crime Institute, 2000.
Krisberg, Barry. “The Legacy of Juvenile Corrections.” Corrections Today 57 (1995): 122-54.
Lanza-Kaduce, Lonn, and Parker, Karen F. A Comparative Recidivism Analysis of Releasees
from Private and Public Prisons in Florida. Gainesville: Center for Studies in Criminology and
Law, University of Florida, 1998.
Lanza-Kaduce, Lonn; Parker, Karen F.; and Thomas, Charles W. “A Comparative Recidivism
Analysis of Releasees from Private and Public Prisons.” Crime & Delinquency 45 (1999): 2847.
Levinson, Robert B., and Taylor, William J. “ACA Studies Privatization in Juvenile
Corrections.” Corrections Today 53 (1991): 242-48.
Lilly, J. Robert, and Knepper, Paul.
Delinquency 39 (1993): 150-66.

“The Corrections-Commercial Complex.”

Crime &

Logan, Charles H. Well Kept: Comparing Quality of Confinement in a Public and a Private
Prison. Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, 1991.

Low, Daniel L. “Nonprofit Private Prisons: The Next Generation of Prison Management.” New
England Journal on Criminal and Civil Confinement 29 (2003): 1-66.
MacKenzie, Doris Layton; Wilson, David B.; and Kider, Suzanne B. “Effects of Correctional
Boot Camps on Offending.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science
578 (2001): 126-43.
Maltz, Michael D. Recidivism. Orlando, Flor.: Academic Press, 1984.
McDonald, Douglas C. “The Costs of Operating Public and Private Correctional Facilities.”
Pages 86-106 in Private Prisons and the Public Interest, edited by Douglas C. McDonald. New
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1990.
McKelvey, Blake. American Prisons: A History of Good Intentions. Montclair, N.J.: Patterson
Smith, 1977.
Moran, Richard. “A Third Option: Nonprofit Prisons.” New York Times (August 23, 1997), 23.
National Criminal Justice Association. Juvenile Justice Reform Initiatives in the States: 19941996. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention, 1997.
Porter, Robert G. “The Privatisation of Prisons in the United States: A Policy That Britain
Should Not Emulate.” Howard Journal of Criminal Justice 29 (1990): 65-81.
Pozen, David E. “Managing a Correctional Marketplace: Prison Privatization in the United
States and the United Kingdom.” Journal of Law and Politics 19 (2003): 253-82.
Ryan, Mick, and Ward, Tony. “Privatization and the Penal System: Britain Misinterprets the
American Experience.” Criminal Justice Review 14 (1989): 1-12.
Schmidt, Peter, and Witte, Ann D. An Economic Analysis of Crime and Justice: Theory,
Methods, and Applications. New York: Academic Press, Inc., 1984.
Sechrest, Dale K., and Shichor, David. “Quick Fixes in Corrections: Reconsidering Private and
Public For-profit Facilities.” Prison Journal 74 (1995): 457-78.
Shichor, David. Punishment for Profit: Private Prisons/Public Concerns. Thousand Oaks,
Calif.: Sage Publications, 1995.
Sickmund, Melissa. “Juvenile Offenders in Residential Placement: 1997-1999.” Juvenile
Offenders and Victims: National Report Series 7 (2002): 1-2. Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.
Snyder, Howard N., and Sickmund, Melissa. Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1999 National
Report. Washington, D.C.: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1999.

Terry, W. Clinton; Stolzenberg, Lisa; and D’Alessio, Stewart J. “Private versus Public
Placements: A Study of Recidivism among Adjudicated Juvenile Offenders.” Juvenile and
Family Court Journal 48 (1997): 33-41.
Thomas, Charles W. “Private Adult Correctional Facility Census: A ‘Real-Time’ Statistical
Profile, December 31, 1999.” http://www.crim.ufl.edu/pcp/census/1999, visited November 21,
2003.
Weisbrod, Burton A. The Nonprofit Economy. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1988.

TABLE 1
INDIVIDUALS AND FACILITIES BY RESTRICTIVENESS LEVEL AND MANAGEMENT TYPE
Level 1
Minimum Risk

Level 2
Low Risk

Level 3
Moderate Risk

Level 4
High Risk

Level 5
Maximum Risk

Total

State

Releasees <= age 17
Facilities

411
8

420
3

896
18

126
3

0
0

1,853
32

For-profit

Releasees <= age 17
Facilities

0
0

74
1

821
9

207
8

13
2

1,115
20

Nonprofit

Releasees <= age 17
Facilities

860
24

1,298
19

2,141
44

526
20

0
0

4,825
107

County

Releasees <= age 17
Facilities

0
0

0
0

422
8

183
1

2
1

607
10

Releasees <= age 17
Facilities

1,271
32

1,792
23

4,280
79

1,042
32

15
3

8,400
169

NOTE.—Source: Florida Department of Juvenile Justice.

TABLE 2
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR SAMPLE USED IN ANALYSIS
Variable
Recidivism
Recidivism – Charged
Recidivism – Adjudicated

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

Definition

5,322
5,322

0.70
0.51

0.46
0.50

1 if client was criminally charged w/in one year of release
1 if client was adjudicated w/in one year of release

Survival Time - Adjudicat.
Recidivism - Charged:
Assault Battery
Felony Weapon
Misd Weapon
Felony Drug
Misd Drug
Felony Sex
Misd Sex
Auto Theft
Burglary
Grand Larceny
Petty Larceny
Robbery
Vandalism
Disorderly Conduct
Escape
Trespassing

2,660

123.5

87.5

Days elapsed from client's release date to date of recidivism offense

5,322
5,322
5,322
5,322
5,322
5,322
5,322
5,322
5,322
5,322
5,322
5,322
5,322
5,322
5,322
5,322

0.21
0.15
0.01
0.11
0.09
0.01
0.00
0.10
0.14
0.10
0.11
0.05
0.05
0.04
0.02
0.08

0.41
0.36
0.11
0.31
0.29
0.12
0.06
0.31
0.35
0.29
0.32
0.22
0.23
0.20
0.13
0.28

1 if charged w/ assault and battery w/in one year of release
1 if charged w/ felony weapon offense w/in one year of release
1 if charged w/ misdemeanor weapon offense w/in one year of release
1 if charged w/ felony drug offense w/in one year of release
1 if charged w/ misdemeanor drug offense w/in one year of release
1 if charged w/ felony sex offense w/in one year of release
1 if charged w/ misdemeanor sex offense w/in one year of release
1 if charged w/ auto theft w/in one year of release
1 if charged w/ burglary w/in one year of release
1 if charged w/ grand larceny (excluding auto theft) w/in one year of release
1 if charged w/ petty larceny (excluding auto theft) w/in one year of release
1 if charged w/ robbery (excluding auto theft) w/in one year of release
1 if charged w/ vandalism w/in one year of release
1 if charged w/ disorderly conduct w/in one year of release
1 if charged w/ unlawful escape (from aftercare) w/in one year of release
1 if charged w/ trespassing w/in one year of release

Criminal History
Felonies
Felonies 0
Felonies 1
Felonies 2-3
Felonies 4-6
Felonies 7+
Felony Weapon
Misd Weapon
Felony Drug
Misd Drug
Felony Sex
Misd Sex
Auto Theft
Burglary
Grand Larceny
Petty Larceny
Robbery
Vandalism
Disorderly Conduct
Escape
Trespassing

5,322
5,322
5,322
5,322
5,322
5,322
5,322
5,322
5,322
5,322
5,322
5,322
5,322
5,322
5,322
5,322
5,322
5,322
5,322
5,322
5,322

5.63
0.04
0.11
0.25
0.29
0.31
0.42
0.05
0.16
0.18
0.08
0.01
0.31
0.62
0.39
0.62
0.15
0.34
0.10
0.11
0.35

5.06
0.20
0.32
0.44
0.45
0.46
0.49
0.21
0.36
0.38
0.27
0.10
0.46
0.48
0.49
0.48
0.36
0.47
0.30
0.31
0.48

Number of felony charges on client's record
1 if prior felony charges = 0
1 if prior felony charges = 1
1 if prior felony charges = 2 or 3
1 if prior felony charges = 4, 5, or 6
1 if prior felony charges = 7 or more
1 if any felony weapon offense charges on client's record
1 if any misdemeanor weapon offense charges on client's record
1 if any felony drug offense charges on client's record
1 if any misdemeanor drug offense charges on client's record
1 if any felony sex offense charges on client's record
1 if any misdemeanor sex offense charges on client's record
1 if any auto theft charges on client's record
1 if any burglary charges (excluding auto theft) on client's record
1 if any grand larceny charges (excluding auto theft) on client's record
1 if any petty larceny charges (excluding auto theft) on client's record
1 if any robbery charges on client's record
1 if any vandalism charges on client's record
1 if any disorderly conduct charges on client's record
1 if any unlawful escape charges on client's record
1 if any trespassing charges on client's record

Individual Characteristics
Female
Black
Age at First Offense
Age at Exit
Length of Stay

5,322
5,322
5,322
5,322
5,322

Neighborhood Characteristics
Crime Rate in Zip
5,216
Per-Cap Inc Race
Percent Own Race in Zip
Unemployment Rate
Incarcerated in Zip

4,621
4,621
4,621
4,621

Facility and Peer Characteristics
Moderate Risk
5,322
High Risk
5,322
Cost per Release
5,322
Facility Size
5,322
Percent Black
5,322
Average Stay
5,322
Same County
5,322
Facility Management Type
State
For-profit
Nonprofit
County

5,322
5,322
5,322
5,322

0.10
0.50
12.55
15.79
194.4

0.31
0.50
1.98
0.96
109.9

1 if client is female
1 if client is black
Client's age in years at first adjudicated criminal offense
Client's age in years at exit from facility
Total length of time (days) spent in facility

360

263
Total number of juvenile referrals in client's home zip code, FY 2000-01
From: 1990 Census of Population and Housing
10,488
4,256
Median per-capita income of client's racial group in home zip code, 1990$
0.59
0.33
% of inhabitants in client's home zip code of same racial group as client, 1990
0.07
0.03
% unemployment rate in client's home zip code, 1990
112
302
Number of people incarcerated in client's home zip code, 1990

0.80
0.20
24,089
55.90
0.52
195.50
0.28

0.40
0.40
18,972
82.01
0.50
80.34
0.45

0.19
0.19
0.50
0.12

0.39
0.40
0.50
0.32

1 if facility is classified as Moderate Risk (Level 3)
1 if facility is classified as High Risk (Level 4)
Average annual cost ($) to the Florida DJJ per client released from facility
Daily avg. # of individuals in facility from which individual was released
% of clients released from facility identified as black
Average length of stay (days) in facility for released clients
1 if facility is located in same county as client's home county

1 if facility is operated directly by the Florida DJJ
1 if facility is operated by private for-profit management
1 if facility is operated by private nonprofit management
1 if facility is operated by a Florida County Sheriff's Department

NOTE.—Source: Florida Department of Juvenile Justice, except as otherwise indicated. Sample
used in analysis includes individuals age 17 or less at date of release from a Level 3 or Level 4 facility.
All means reported for individuals. Sixty of the 2,720 individuals who were re-adjudicated within a year
are missing information concerning the date of their recidivism offense(s).
Neighborhood
characteristics are constructed for Florida zipcodes only. Individuals with zipcodes from other states are
assigned a zero for all neighborhood characteristics, and a dummy variable denoting that an individual
has an out-of-state zipcode is included in all regressions. This allows us to maintain the full sample for
the regressions, and controls for the potential problem that out-of-state youths are less likely to
recidivate in Florida.

TABLE 3
PROFILE BY FACILITY MANAGEMENT TYPE
State

For-profit

Nonprofit

County

Number of Facilities

21

17

64

9

Clients Released <= Age 17

996

1,028

2,667

631

% Recidivism (Charged) in First Year

69.0%

76.4%

68.1%

65.9%

% Recidivism (Adjudicated) in First Year

51.0%

57.3%

49.4%

48.5%

Mean Survival Time
(for those who re-adjudicate in first year)

121.2
(85.0)

117.4
(86.4)

126.1
(89.9)

127.9
(82.7)

Mean Felonies per Individual

5.38
(4.65)

6.40
(5.21)

5.36
(5.07)

5.94
(5.29)

24,807
(23,013)

20,259
(10,292)

24,952
(20,853)

22,750
(5,181)

Mean Length of Stay (Days)

164
(101)

218
(106)

194
(110)

201
(117)

Mean Age at Exit (Years)

15.79
(0.86)

15.90
(0.84)

15.68
(1.07)

16.10
(0.70)

Mean Facility Size (Daily Avg. # of Individuals)

19.9
(18.6)

37.4
(62.4)

19.4
(10.0)

39.9
(70.9)

Mean % Black Clients per Facility

0.56
(0.13)

0.42
(0.07)

0.47
(0.14)

0.49
(0.14)

Mean % Male Clients per Facility

0.89
(0.31)

0.94
(0.23)

0.86
(0.34)

0.96
(0.20)

58
697
106
25
0
0
101
0
0
0
0

0
199
24
64
34
49
631
0
0
0
0

368
1,238
280
221
23
62
157
0
72
193
37

0
0
0
0
0
0
183
448
0
0
0

Mean Annual Cost to DJJ per Release ($)

Number of Releases by Programming Type:
Wilderness and Work Program
Halfway House – Male
Halfway House – Female
Intensive Halfway House – Male
Intensive Halfway House – Female
Serious or Habitual Offender Program
Youth Development Center
Boot Camp
Therapeutic Wilderness Camp
Special Needs Program
Sexual Offender Program

Forestry Youth Academy
Out of State
Intensive Residential Treatment

9
0
0

0
27
0

0
0
16

0
0
0

NOTE.—Source: Florida Department of Juvenile Justice. Sample of individuals age 17 or less at
date of release from a Level 3 or Level 4 facility. Means are reported for individuals in each facility
management type except for the mean facility size, which is reported for all facilities. Standard
deviations are in parentheses. Descriptions of each Programming Type are provided in the Appendix.

TABLE 4
THE EFFECT OF FACILITY MANAGEMENT TYPE ON RECIDIVISM (Adjudicated)
Dependent Variable:

Recidivism – Adjudicated
(1)
OLS

(2)
OLS

(3)
OLS

(4)
OLS

(5)
OLS

State

-0.063+
(0.038)

-0.061*
(0.027)

-0.049+
(0.026)

-0.052*
(0.026)

-0.052*
(0.023)

Nonprofit

-0.079*
(0.032)

-0.066**
(0.021)

-0.056**
(0.020)

-0.064**
(0.021)

-0.060**
(0.019)

County

-0.088*
(0.043)

-0.071*
(0.033)

-0.069*
(0.031)

-0.075*
(0.036)

-0.071*
(0.032)

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

Estimation Method:

Includes Controls For:
Individual Characteristics
Criminal History, Restrictiveness Level
Neighborhood, Facility and Peer Characteristics
Judicial Circuit Dummies

YES

R2

0.004

0.046

0.058

0.061

0.075

N

5,322

5,322

5,322

5,322

5,322

NOTE.—Sample of individuals age 17 or less at date of release from a Level 3 or Level 4 facility. For-profit is omitted category.
Standard errors, in parentheses, account for clustering of observations at the facility level. The full list of controls, except for the judicial
circuit dummies, is shown in Table 6.
+
, *, ** Statistically significant at the .10, .05, and .01 level, respectively.

TABLE 5
THE EFFECT OF FACILITY MANAGEMENT TYPE ON RECIDIVISM (Charged)
Dependent Variable:

Recidivism - Charged
(1)
OLS

(2)
OLS

State

-0.074*
(0.032)

-0.066**
(0.022)

-0.052**
(0.019)

-0.063**
(0.020)

-0.073**
(0.017)

Nonprofit

-0.083**
(0.023)

-0.067**
(0.015)

-0.053**
(0.014)

-0.052**
(0.016)

-0.058**
(0.015)

County

-0.104*
(0.041)

-0.085*
(0.033)

-0.083**
(0.026)

-0.086**
(0.033)

-0.084**
(0.030)

Estimation Method:

Includes Controls For:
Individual Characteristics

YES

Criminal History, Restrictiveness Level

(3)
OLS

(4)
OLS

(5)
OLS

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

Neighborhood, Facility and Peer Characteristics
Judicial Circuit Dummies

YES

R2

0.055

0.085

0.107

0.112

0.124

N

5,322

5,322

5,322

5,322

5,322

NOTE.—Sample of individuals age 17 or less at date of release from a Level 3 or Level 4 facility. For-profit is omitted category.
Standard errors, in parentheses, account for clustering of observations at the facility level. The full list of controls, except for the judicial
circuit dummies, is shown in Table 6.
*, ** Statistically significant at the .05 and .01 level, respectively.

TABLE 6
PREDICTING RECIDIVISM WITHIN ONE YEAR
Dependent Variable:
Observations:
Variable

Recidivism - Adjudicated
5,322
Estimate

Std. Error

Facility Management Type
State
Nonprofit
County

-0.053
-0.060
-0.071

0.023
0.019
0.032

*
**
*

Individual Characteristics
Female
Black
Age at First Offense
Age at Exit
Length of Stay (/100)

-0.164
0.141
-0.008
-0.048
0.004

0.025
0.025
0.005
0.008
0.009

**
**
*
**

Criminal History
Felonies 1
Felonies 2-3
Felonies 4-6
Felonies 7+
Felony Weapon
Misd Weapon
Felony Drug
Misd Drug
Felony Sex
Misd Sex
Auto Theft
Burglary
Grand Larceny
Petty Larceny
Robbery
Vandalism
Disorderly Conduct
Escape
Trespassing

0.040
0.027
0.052
0.080
-0.005
-0.016
0.033
0.032
-0.026
-0.012
0.053
0.023
-0.010
0.037
0.011
0.021
0.021
0.049
0.001

0.040
0.037
0.038
0.043
0.016
0.028
0.019
0.020
0.023
0.064
0.016
0.021
0.013
0.013
0.021
0.013
0.023
0.020
0.016

Facility Restrictiveness Level
Moderate Risk

-0.010

0.013

Neighborhood Characteristics
Crime Rate in Zip (/1,000)
Per-Cap Inc Race (/1,000)
Percent Own Race in Zip

0.004
0.007
0.023

0.030
0.003
0.028

+

+

**

**

*

**

Unemployment Rate
Incarcerated in Zip (/1,000)

0.043
-0.001

0.394
0.023

Facility and Peer Characteristics
Percent Black
Average Stay (/100)
Same County

0.015
-0.041
-0.006

-0.075
0.015
0.015

**

NOTE.—Sample of individuals age 17 or less at date of release from a Level 3 or Level 4 facility.
For-profit, Felonies 0, and High Risk are omitted categories. Standard errors account for clustering of
observations at the facility level. Judicial circuit dummies are included in the regression.
+
, *, ** Statistically significant at the .10, .05, and .01 level, respectively.

TABLE 7
RECIDIVISM (Charged) ACROSS CRIME CATEGORIES
Dependent Variable:
Observations:

Recidivism - Charged for each crime category
5,322
State

Nonprofit

County

-0.025+
(0.015)

-0.006
(0.012)

0.004
(0.018)

Felony Weapon

-0.028+
(0.015)

-0.002
(0.013)

-0.017
(0.016)

Misd Weapon

0.006
(0.005)

0.001
(0.003)

0.002
(0.004)

Felony Drug

-0.019
(0.013)

-0.017
(0.012)

-0.030*
(0.014)

Misd Drug

-0.007
(0.011)

-0.004
(0.011)

-0.011
(0.011)

Felony Sex

-0.013*
(0.005)

-0.012**
(0.004)

-0.015**
(0.005)

Misd Sex

-0.001
(0.003)

-0.002
(0.003)

0.002
(0.003)

Auto Theft

-0.035**
(0.011)

-0.036**
(0.010)

-0.032*
(0.014)

Burglary

-0.004
(0.017)

-0.020
(0.016)

-0.054*
(0.021)

Grand Larceny

0.000
(0.014)

0.003
(0.013)

-0.004
(0.016)

Petty Larceny

-0.017+
(0.009)

-0.009
(0.007)

-0.051**
(0.014)

Robbery

0.000
(0.010)

-0.012+
(0.007)

-0.020+
(0.011)

Vandalism

-0.006
(0.010)

0.000
(0.010)

-0.005
(0.012)

Disorderly Conduct

-0.006
(0.009)

0.001
(0.008)

0.008
(0.010)

Escape

0.008
(0.007)

0.005
(0.005)

0.030
(0.005)

Recidivism – Charged:
Assault Battery

Trespassing

-0.036**
(0.010)

-0.021+
(0.011)

-0.027+
(0.015)

NOTE.—Sample of individuals age 17 or less at date of release from a Level 3 or Level 4 facility.
For-profit is omitted category. Standard errors, in parentheses, account for clustering of observations at
the facility level. The full set of variables shown in Table 6 as well as the judicial circuit dummies are
included in all regressions.
+
, *, ** Statistically significant at the .10, .05, and .01 level, respectively.

TABLE 8
SURVIVAL TIME ANALYSIS AND COSTS TO THE STATE
Specification

Survival Time Analysis

Cost

Dependent Variable

Recidivism - Adjudicated

Recidivism - Adjudicated

Recidivism - Adjudicated

Cost per Release ($)

Estimation Method:

Proportional Hazards
(1)

Weibull Distribution
(2)

Exponential Distribution
(3)

OLS
(4)

State

0 .875*
(0.056)

0 .874*
(0.059)

0.872*
(0.060)

11,563**
(3,627)

Nonprofit

0.838**
(0.045)

0.834**
(0.047)

0.831**
(0.049)

6,123**
(2,169)

County

0.810*
(0.077)

0.811*
(0.081)

0.809*
(0.082)

2,760
(6,677)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Includes Full Controls
R2
N

0.535
5,322

5,322

5,322

111

NOTE.—Sample of individuals age 17 or less at date of release from a Level 3 or Level 4 facility. For-profit is omitted category.
Standard errors, in parentheses, account for clustering of observations at the facility level. Full controls are complete set of variables shown
in Table 6 along with the judicial circuit dummies.
*, ** Statistically significant at the .05 and .01 level, respectively.

TABLE 9
ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS – CONTROLLING FOR PROGRAMMING TYPE
Dependent Variable:

Recidivism - Adjudic.

Recidivism - Charged

Recidivism - Adjudic.

Cost per Release ($)

Estimation Method:

OLS
(1)

OLS
(2)

Proportional Hazards
(3)

OLS
(5)

Management Type:
State

-0.060*
(0.030)

-0.082**
(0.020)

0.877
(0.071)

12,899**
(3,720)

Nonprofit

-0.066*
(0.028)

-0.066**
(0.017)

0.843*
(0.068)

8,048*
(3,544)

County

-0.009
(0.025)

-0.007
(0.020)

0.9930
(0.088)

-25,923**
(6,154)

Programming Type (results are relative to Boot Camps (448)):
Halfway House - Male (2,134)

0.101*
(0.044)

0.129**
(0.036)

1.355*
(0.189)

-39,650**
(6,658)

Youth Development Center (1,072)

0.101*
(0.048)

0.117**
(0.040)

1.420*
(0.216)

-31,945**
(6,384)

Wilderness and Work Program (426)

0.091+
(0.047)

0.136**
(0.038)

1.327+
(0.196)

-42,266**
(7,111)

Halfway House - Female (410)

0.130*
(0.060)

0.102
(0.062)

1.476
(0.354)

-46,049**
(11,773)

Intensive Hwy. House - Male (310)

0.127*
(0.055)

0.137**
(0.047)

1.495*
(0.292)

-53.981**
(11,687)

Special Needs Program (193)

0.052
(0.065)

0.058
(0.051)

1.169
(0.201)

-40,035**
(7,451)

Serious or Habitual Offen. Prog. (111)

0.071
(0.108)

0.106+
(0.062)

1.291
(0.461)

-44,820**
(11,896)

Therapeutic Wilderness Camp (72)

0.145
(0.089)

0.124
(0.095)

1.456
(0.385)

9,631
(16,284)

Intensive Hwy. House - Female (57)

0.112
(0.120)

0.140*
(0.068)

1.373
(0.721)

-63,485**
(16,695)

Sexual Offender Program (37)

0.079
(0.072)

-0.066
(0.059)

1.154
(0.305)

-18,641
(28,851)

Out of State (27)

-0.035
(0.078)

0.048
(0.066)

0.930
(0.236)

-61,106**
(13,291)

Intensive Residential Treatment (16)

0.195*
(0.078)

0.128+
(0.066)

1.672+
(0.441)

6,173
(12,755)

Forestry Youth Academy (9)

0.017
(0.051)

-0.043
(0.048)

0.944
(0.150)

3,787
(9,038)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

N

5,322

5,322

5,322

111

R2

0.079

0.128

Includes Full Controls

0.762

NOTE.—Sample of individuals age 17 or less at date of release from a Level 3 or Level 4 facility.
For-profit and Boot Camp are omitted categories. Standard errors, in parentheses, account for clustering
of observations at the facility level. Descriptions of each Programming Type are provided in the
Appendix. The number shown in parentheses following each programming type is the total number of
individuals age 17 or less released during the evaluation period. Full controls are complete set of
variables shown in Table 6 along with the judicial circuit dummies.
+
, *, ** Statistically significant at the .10, .05, and .01 level, respectively.

TABLE 10
ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS – CONTROLLING FOR PROGRAMMING TYPE AND FACILITY SIZE
Dependent Variable:

Recidivism - Adjudic.

Recidivism - Charged

Recidivism - Adjudic.

Cost per Release ($)

Estimation Method:

OLS
(1)

OLS
(2)

Exponential Distribution
(3)

OLS
(4)

State

-0.049
(0.030)

-0.078**
(0.020)

0.879
(0.076)

9,378**
(3,361)

Nonprofit

-0.056+
(0.029)

-0.062**
(0.018)

0.864+
(0.075)

4,805
(3,086)

County

-0.054*
(0.024)

-0.024
(0.027)

0.849+
(0.075)

-12,476*
(5,459)

Facility Size (/100)

0.039**
(0.012)

0.015
(0.014)

1.125*
(0.052)

-11,760**
(4,087)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

N

5,322

5,322

5,322

111

R2

0.079

0.128

Includes Full Controls

0.793

NOTE.—Sample of individuals age 17 or less at date of release from a Level 3 or Level 4 facility.
For-profit is omitted category. Standard errors, in parentheses, account for clustering of observations at
the facility level. Full controls are complete set of variables shown in Table 6 along with the judicial
circuit dummies, facility size, and the variables characterizing programming type.
+
, *, ** Statistically significant at the .10, .05, and .01 level, respectively.

TABLE 11
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS

Predicted Daily Survival Rate
Predicted Daily Hazard Rate
Expected Cost Difference per Release ($)

For-profit

State

Nonprofit

County

0.99775
0.00225

0.99804
0.00196
11,563

0.99813
0.00187
6,123

0.99819
0.00181
2,760

Expected Future Number of Days in Correctional Facility
1 year from release

90.8

81.5

78.4

76.6

At age 18 (2.2 years)

223.0

201.4

194.0

189.9

5 years from release − Assumption 1

432.5

389.1

374.3

366.1

5 years from release − Assumption 2

533.6

483.5

466.2

456.5

1 year from release

9.2
(4.4)

12.4
(3.6)

14.2
(6.6)

At age 18 (2.2 years)

21.6
(10.4)

29.0
(8.5)

33.2
(15.6)

5 years from release − Assumption 1

43.5
(20.9)

58.2
(17.2)

66.4
(30.3)

5 years from release − Assumption 2

50.1
(24.3)

67.4
(19.3)

77.0
(35.4)

Expected Additional Days out of Confinement Relative to For-profit

Value ($) of Additional Day out of Confinement to Justify Choice versus For-profit
1 year from release

1,253
(526)

496
(163)

196
(302)

At age 18 (2.2 years)

535
(225)

211
(70)

84
(129)

5 years from release − Assumption 1

266
(112)

105
(30)

42
(63)

5 years from release − Assumption 2

231
(98)

91
(29)

36
(55)

NOTE.—Standard errors shown in table (in parentheses) were bootstrapped using the standard errors
reported for the corresponding parameters. Assumption 1: recidivism rates fall by one-third between the
ages of 18 to 21 relative to the ages of 16 to 18. Assumption 2: differences in recidivism rates remain as
they are for the juveniles in our sample.

